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INTRODUCTION: TAKINGS FROM THE TOP 
The concept of a regulatory taking, or technically “inverse 
condemnation,” made its first appearance on page ten of the very first 
issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal in 1972, when New York 
Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz made the following observation 
in his lead article: “The courts have reduced the scope of [the usque 
ad coelum] doctrine, allowing an owner aggrieved by noise from 
overflights to recover damages for what is termed an inverse 
condemnation, while holding that the doctrine does not justify the 
granting of an injunction against overflights.”1  That first article—
 
* Richard E. Nelson Chair in Local Government Law, University of Florida Levin 
College of Law.  The author thanks the students and faculty at Fordham Law School 
for the opportunity to share my ideas at the stimulating event marking the fortieth 
birthday of this distinguished journal, the Levin College of Law for research support, 
and Mark Fenster for his perceptive comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Jamaica Bay: An Urban Marshland in Transition, 1 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 10 (1972). 
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Jamaica Bay: An Urban Marshland in Transition—is an early 
example of what we now call “urban environmental law,”2 in which 
the author discussed public trust, wetlands protection, NEPA, public 
nuisance, and noise, air, and water pollution.  He looked forward to 
federal protection for the bay, which became a reality on October 27 
of the same year as the Gateway National Recreational Area.3 
The tension between private property and the public interest was 
just below the surface of the text of Attorney General Lefkowitz’s 
article, much like the creatures clinging to life in the murky, polluted 
waters of the bay.4  Over the course of the next four decades, as all 
levels of government engaged in a growing and exceedingly diverse 
set of environmentally flavored land use regulations, this tension rose 
to the surface and began to dominate legal discussions—in legal briefs 
and court decisions, in the classroom, and in expert commentary, 
including, of course, in the pages of the Fordham Urban Law Journal 
itself.5 
Metropolitan New York City was the geographic focus of 
Lefkowitz’s inaugural article, a reminder that “urban” and 
“environmental” are not necessarily distinct descriptors.  The same 
city was the setting for two important and, I believe, regrettable 
Supreme Court decisions that set the stage for legal murkiness that 
lingers to this day.6 While many of the Court’s regulatory takings 
cases came to the justices from the nation’s coastal regions,7 the fact 
remains that the “brooding omnipresence”8 of regulatory takings is 
decidedly urban in its origins and continues to have many important 
implications in the field of urban law. 
 
 2. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Robinson, Urban Environmental Law: Emergent 
Citizens’ Rights for the Aesthetic, the Spiritual, and the Spacious, 4 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 467 (1976). 
 3. See Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-592, 86 Stat. 1308.   
 4. See, e.g., Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 3–4 (“The effect of all this dumping, 
filling and outright pollution on Jamaica Bay’s once thriving shellfish industry has 
been predictably devastating.”). 
 5. See infra Table I and notes 98–109 and accompanying text. 
 6.  See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).   
 7. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); City of Monterey v. 
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621(1981). 
 8. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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I.  FROM SCRANTON TO THE BIG APPLE: CITY SETTINGS FOR THE 
REGULATORY TAKINGS DRAMA 
We have Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the pride of Brahmin 
Boston, to thank for the term “brooding omnipresence” and for the 
jurisprudential curiosity we now call regulatory takings.  The phrase 
first appeared in Holmes’s dissenting opinion in 1917’s Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Jensen,9 a dispute concerning the validity of New York’s 
“Workmen’s Compensation Act.”10  Justice Holmes observed that 
“[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the 
articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be 
identified; although some decisions with which I have disagreed seem 
to me to have forgotten the fact.”11  In 1922, Holmes’s seminal 
regulatory takings opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon12 
concerned a dispute over coal-rich land in Scranton, Pennsylvania—
the 47th largest city in the United States according to the 1920 
Census, with a population of over 137,000.13  Counsel for the city 
submitted several photographs to the Supreme Court depicting severe 
damage to houses, apartments, streets, a cemetery, and public 
buildings in Scranton caused by mine caves.14  While William Fischel 
has raised serious questions about the facts on and below the 
ground,15 it is indisputable that the case counsel presented to the 
Court involved the Kohler Act’s impact in an urban setting.16 
For the next forty years, Holmes’s eminently unhelpful and 
precedent-deficient “too far” test lay dormant, at least as applied to 
cases involving regulation of real property.17  This period, of course, 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. 1914 N.Y. Laws 216–51.   
 11. S. Pac. Co., 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 12. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 13. Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1920, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(June 15, 1998), http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/ 
tab15.txt. 
 14. Exhibits in Connection with Brief of the City of Scranton, Intervenor, Pa. 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (No. 549).  
 15. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
POLITICS 26 (1995) (“Surface damage . . . seems to have been episodic and limited; 
cities were not literally falling into the earth.”). 
 16. See Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 394. 
 17. See, e.g., Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival 
of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2165–66 (2002) (“[T]he 
majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal apparently had little impact on how the Court 
analyzed the legitimacy of regulations affecting the use and development of land in 
the years immediately following the issuance of the opinion.”).  Between the year of 
the Pennsylvania Coal decision (1922) and the year of the Penn Central decision 
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included the heyday of early zoning cases from 1926 to 1928—even 
Nectow v. City of Cambridge18 and Washington ex rel. Seattle Title 
Trust Co. v. Roberge,19 which were landowner victories.  In 1962, 
after toying with inverse condemnation in cases such as United States 
v. Causby20 (low-flying aircraft), Armstrong v. United States21 
(material liens), and Griggs v. Allegheny County, Pennsylvania22 
(low-altitude flights), it looked as if the justices were prepared to 
revisit the constitutionality of land use regulation when they agreed to 
hear Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, New York,23 an ultimately 
unsuccessful takings challenge to a New York suburb’s regulation of 
dredging and pit excavating.  Today, Goldblatt is probably most 
notable because Mario Matthew Cuomo—the future New York 
governor (and current Governor Andrew Cuomo’s father)—was one 
of the attorneys listed on the appellee town’s brief.24  Mahon was cited 
in passing, not even quoted,25 and it would be another sixteen years 
until the Court dipped its toes into the regulatory taking waters. 
 
(1978), the Court cited Justice Holmes’s opinion in only one case involving land use 
regulation. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) 
(holding that an ordinance that regulated excavation within the town limits was a 
valid exercise of the police power and not unconstitutional). 
 18.  277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928) (“That the invasion of the property of plaintiff in 
error was serious and highly injurious is clearly established; and, since a necessary 
basis for the support of that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning authorities 
comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be sustained.”). 
 19. 278 U.S. 116, 121–22 (1928) (“[Section 3(c) of the zoning ordinance] purports 
to give the owners of less than one-half the land within 400 feet of the proposed 
building authority—uncontrolled  by any standard or rule prescribed by legislative 
action—to prevent the trustee from using its land for the proposed home.”). 
 20. 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (“Flights over private land are not a taking, unless 
they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the 
enjoyment and use of the land.”). 
 21. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“Neither the boats’ immunity, after being acquired by 
the Government, from enforcement of the liens nor the use of a contract to take title 
relieves the Government from its constitutional obligation to pay just compensation 
for the value of the liens the petitioners lost and of which loss the Government was 
the direct, positive beneficiary.”). 
 22. 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962) (“Without the ‘approach areas,’ an airport is indeed not 
operable.  Respondent in designing it had to acquire some private property.  Our 
conclusion is that by constitutional standards it did not acquire enough.”). 
 23. 369 U.S. 590, 590–91 (1962). 
 24. See Brief for Appellee, Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369 U.S. 590 
(1962) (No. 78), 1961 WL 101618. 
 25. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594 (“This is not to say, however, that governmental 
action in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which 
constitutionally requires compensation.”). 
WOLF_CHRISTENSENCHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:33 PM 
2013] BROODING OMNIPRESENCE 1839 
The ghost of Holmes’s “too far” test was finally exhumed in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,26 in a problematic 
opinion written by one of the most liberal justices in the Court’s long 
and distinguished history—Newark, New Jersey’s William J. Brennan, 
Jr.27  Joining Justice William Rehnquist’s dissent was Chief Justice 
Warren Burger and the Court’s newest member—Chicago’s own 
John Paul Stevens.  President Gerald Ford appointed Stevens to 
replace William O. Douglas, the uber-liberal that then-House 
Republican Leader Ford tried to impeach in 1970.28  But, before we 
get to the exegetical excesses of Penn Central, we need to pause to 
consider the state of expert commentary and state court 
jurisprudence regarding regulations that might (or might not) amount 
to takings requiring compensation. 
II.  EXPERT COMMENTARY BEFORE THE FLOOD 
One needs only the number of toes on one foot to count the 
leading, then-recent law review articles available to the many judges 
and lawyers at the time of the Fordham Urban Law Journal’s 
founding, who were struggling to distinguish police power regulations 
of land use from uncompensated takings (and the number of digits on 
Homer Simpson’s hand to count the number of authors of those 
articles).  Here, in chronological order, is my list (which may well be 
too subjective to pass any empirical test): Griggs v. Allegheny County 
in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law by 
Allison Dunham;29 Takings and the Police Power by Joseph L. Sax;30 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law by Frank I. Michelman;31 
Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse 
 
 26. 438 U.S. 104, 152 (1978). 
 27. For details on Justice Brennan’s life, see generally SETH STERN & STEPHEN 
WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION (2010). 
 28. See, e.g., BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 415–18, 430 (2003); Congressman Gerald R. Ford, House 
Republican Leader, Remarks Prepared for Delivery on the Floor of the U.S. House 
of Representatives (Apr. 15, 1970), available at http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/ 
library/speeches/700415.pdf. 
 29. Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of 
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63 (1962). 
 30. Joseph L. Sax , Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). 
 31. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
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Condemnation Criteria  by Arvo Van Alstyne;32 and Takings, Private 
Property and Public Rights by Sax.33  A few representative quotations 
from each article will help recreate the tone and substance of the 
takings conversation during the early 1970s. 
Even as early as 1962, Professor Dunham, an established property 
scholar at the University of Chicago, referred to “a crazy-quilt pattern 
of Supreme Court doctrine on the law of expropriation.”34  After 
reviewing the cases involving “Police Power Versus Eminent-Domain 
Power,”35 he concluded, “The most that the Court has been able to 
develop as guiding principles are indications of some of the factors it 
considers relevant.  The weight to be assigned to these factors in any 
given case has not yet been disclosed.”36  Most unfortunately, this left 
the justices merely to “follow the Holmesian tradition of stating that 
property expectations may be damaged ‘to a certain extent’ but ‘if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.’”37 
Two years later, Joe Sax, a newly minted associate professor at the 
University of Colorado, came out of the gate with his first of two 
takings pieces in the Yale Law Journal.  Like Dunham, Sax 
bemoaned the puzzling state of takings jurisprudence, noting that 
“the predominant characteristic of this area of law is a welter of 
confusing and apparently incompatible results.”38  With the 
confidence and chutzpah of youth, Sax proposed what he called a 
“workable rule of law”39 for distinguishing between regulations and 
takings.  On the one hand, “when economic loss is incurred as a result 
of government enhancement of its resource position in its enterprise 
capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required; it is that 
result which is to be characterized as a taking.”40  On the other hand, 
“losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of government 
acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-
compensable exercise of the police power.”41  Now, wasn’t that easy? 
 
 32. Arvo Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for 
Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971). 
 33. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 
(1971). 
 34. Dunham, supra note 29, at 63. 
 35. Id. at 73. 
 36. Id. at 81. 
 37. Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 
 38. Sax, supra note 30, at 37. 
 39. Id. at 63. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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In 1967, Michelman, recently promoted to full professor at 
Harvard, entered the fray with a piece published in the law review 
from his home school.  This impressively dense piece would prove to 
be highly influential.42  What is often forgotten about Property, 
Utility, and Fairness is that the author chose not to engage in “efforts 
to arrive at a systematic restatement of the legal doctrine [à la 
Dunham], or to reformulate doctrine, redirect it, or overhaul it [à la 
Sax] . . . .”43  In fact, what Michelman “counselled” in this piece was 
“a de-emphasis of reliance on judicial action as a method of dealing 
with the problem of compensation.”44  If litigants, counsel, and the 
courts had heeded young Michelman’s advice, only my fellow legal 
historians and I would be talking about that relic once known as 
“regulatory taking.”  Thanks to this groundbreaking article, takings 
scholars can all recite “that compensation is due whenever 
demoralization costs exceed settlement costs, and not otherwise.”45  
But just because we can use words to describe what is “fair” and 
“efficient” does not mean that we can rely on the courts to achieve 
those goals. 
The next major offering from the legal academy was a 1971 article 
by University of Utah law professor Arvo Van Alstyne, who echoed 
the complaints of his predecessors regarding the sorry state of takings 
law: “With some exceptions, the decisional law is largely 
characterized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained 
in conclusory terminology, circular reasoning and empty rhetoric.”46  
With the benefit of hindsight, we can easily say, plus ça change, plus 
c’est la même chose.  Despite those significant barriers, Van Alstyne 
chose to analyze “three broad categories of recurring situations in 
which claims of unconstitutional taking or damaging of private 
property, as a result of regulatory measures, have been repeatedly 
asserted.”47  The three categories included regulation of personal 
property and activity, land use controls, and “[r]egulations requiring 
property owners to engage in specified conduct at their own expense, 
or to make prescribed contributions or expenditures for specified 
 
 42. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, In Tribute: Frank I. Michelman, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 896, 897 (2012) (“Little did I know at the time I first read it that Property, 
Utility, and Fairness, published in 1967, was Frank’s first big foray into the world of 
scholarship.  It became one of the few such works with lasting impact.”). 
 43. Michelman, supra note 31, at 1167. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1215.  
 46. Van Alstyne, supra note 32, at 2. 
 47. Id. at 3. 
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public purposes . . . .”48  Like Michelman, Van Alstyne saw little 
evidence that the courts were up to the task of bringing sense to this 
wide-ranging expanse of issues, so he recommended turning to 
elected lawmakers, as “it seems clear that the legislature has the 
capability for defining limits and providing remedial techniques which 
will strike a better balance than is now the case between the 
competing interests in social order and private justice.”49 
Also in 1971, Joe Sax, now a full professor at the University of 
Michigan, took another bite out of the Fifth Amendment apple in his 
second Yale piece in less than a half-decade50—a stellar pair of 
journal placements then and now.  What makes this accomplishment 
even more impressive was the author’s confession that he did not get 
it exactly right the first time around: “I am compelled . . . to disown 
the view that whenever government can be said to be acquiring 
resources for its own account, compensation must be paid.”51  Upon 
reconsideration, Sax “view[ed] the problem as considerably more 
complex.”52  Thankfully we don’t have to speculate as to the reasons 
why Sax was “compelled” to reconceive the concept.53  The first, 
“external” reason was the development of an entirely new field, a 
field in which Sax’s words and ideas would have a profound impact 
for decades—modern environmental law: “Contemporary interest in 
environmental quality has spawned various attempts at property 
regulation, many of which actually or potentially collide with the 
takings provision.”54  The second, “internal” reason, prompted by the 
first, was Sax’s realization that “the traditional view of property 
rights, which focuses solely on activities occurring within the physical 
boundaries of the user’s property” needed to be replaced “with a 
view founded on a recognition of the interconnectedness between 
various uses of seemingly unrelated pieces of property.”55  Here’s the 
ultra-Saxy payoff: “Once property is seen as an interdependent 
network of competing uses, rather than as a number of independent 
and isolated entities, property rights and the law of takings are open 
for modification”56—that is, the shift from Sax 1964 to Sax 1971.  
 
 48. Id. at 48. 
 49. Id. at 73. 
 50. See Sax, supra note 30. 
 51. Sax, supra note 33, at 150 n.5. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 150.   
 54. Id. at 149. 
 55. Id. at 150. 
 56. Id. 
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There was a distinctively Coasean/Calabresian tone57 to Sax redux: 
“[T]he goal of the system ought to be to identify that constituency 
which, if charged with the costs of accommodating the conflict, would 
have a large stake in a lower cost solution, and which is capable of 
organizing to cope with the problem.”58  To this theoretical 
development, we can say: encore plus ça change! 
At this point, one year before the founding of the Fordham Urban 
Law Journal and seven years before Penn Central, much of this 
regulatory takings discussion was not highly relevant to the work of 
the Supreme Court, a tribunal that, as noted previously, was basically 
out of the land use regulation business.59  In the decade before the 
Journal’s founding, there was an increasing flurry of activity in state 
courts owing to the growing acceptance of zoning, floodplain 
regulation, wetlands restrictions, and open space and historic 
preservation.60  Many of these cases were discussed, catalogued, and 
 
 57. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability 
Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 440 (1995) (“Ronald 
Coase’s essay on The Problem of Social Cost introduced the world to transaction 
costs, and the introduction laid the foundation for an ongoing cottage industry in law 
and economics. And of all the law-and-economics scholarship built on Coase’s 
insights, perhaps the most widely known and influential contribution has been 
Calabresi and Melamed’s discussion of what they called ‘property rules’ and ‘liability 
rules.’”) (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972)). 
 58. Sax, supra note 33, at 182.  
 59. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.  
 60. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm’n, 197 A.2d 770, 773 (Conn. 
1964) (“[T]he change of zone to flood plain district froze the area into a practically 
unusable state.  The uses which are presently permitted in the new zone place such 
limitations on the area that the enforcement of the regulation amounts, in effect, to a 
practical confiscation of the land.”); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 235 So. 2d 402, 
406 (La. 1970) (“[A] review thereof does establish to our complete satisfaction the 
fact that the Maher cottage composed part of the elusive ‘tout ensemble’ of the Vieux 
Carre . . . and that it does have architectural value.”); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 
716 (Me. 1970) (“The application of the Wetlands restriction in the terms of the 
denial of appellants’ proposal to fill, and enjoining them from so doing deprives them 
of the reasonable use of their property and . . . is both an unreasonable exercise of 
police power and equivalent to taking within constitutional considerations.”); Morris 
Cnty. Land Improvement Co. v. Twp. of Parsipanny-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232, 234 
(N.J. 1963) (“The fundamental question in this case is the constitutional validity of 
provisions of defendant township’s zoning ordinance which greatly restrict the use of 
swampland and have for their prime object the retention of the land substantially in 
its natural state, essentially for public purposes.”); Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 
A.2d 597, 611 (Pa. 1965) (“If the preservation of open spaces is the township 
objective, there are means by which this can be accomplished which include 
authorization for ‘cluster zoning’ or condemnation of development rights with 
compensation paid for that which is taken.”). 
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criticized in the articles noted above,61 but again there was no 
coherence, no regularity, no predictability. 
III.  LIBERAL JUSTICES AND PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
PROTECTION: A COMPLEX DYNAMIC 
Things did not get better—in fact they got much worse—when the 
Court rendered its opinion in New York City’s favor in Penn Central.  
The Brennan majority’s ad hoc, multi-part, balancing test62 certainly 
was not necessary.  The heart of the case was the Court’s attempt to 
fit landmark designation into the Euclidean zoning mode, which came 
with generous judicial deference.63  That is why Justice Rehnquist 
opened his dissent by showing how few city landowners were targeted 
by designation and by stating that “[o]nly in the most superficial sense 
of the word can this be said to involve ‘zoning.’”64 
Even though the takings discussion was dictum, given that the 
landmark law fit comfortably under the police power umbrella,65 
Justice Brennan and his colleagues should have been more careful in 
 
 61. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 33 at 149 n.4. 
 62. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“In 
engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s decisions have 
identified several factors that have particular significance.  The economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations.  So, too, is the character of the governmental action.  A ‘taking’ may 
more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a 
physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good.”) (citation omitted). 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 125 (“More importantly for the present case, in instances in 
which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that ‘the health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of 
land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected 
recognized real property interests.”); id. at 131 (“Appellants concede that the 
decisions sustaining other land-use regulations, which, like the New York City law, 
are reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare, uniformly reject the 
proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a 
‘taking.’”); id. at 133–34 (“Similarly, zoning laws often affect some property owners 
more severely than others but have not been held to be invalid on that account.  For 
example, the property owner in [Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926),] who wished to use its property for industrial purposes was affected 
far more severely by the ordinance than its neighbors who wished to use their land 
for residences.”). 
 64. Id. at 139 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 65. See, e.g., id. at 135 (“This is no more an appropriation of property by 
government for its own uses than is a zoning law prohibiting, for ‘aesthetic’ reasons, 
two or more adult theaters within a specified area, or a safety regulation prohibiting 
excavations below a certain level.”) (citation omitted). 
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the terms they employed in key passages of the decision.  After all, 
the essence of constitutional lawmaking is the written word.  Most 
worrisome was the majority’s repeated use of the words “substantial” 
and “substantially,” as, for example, when the Court observed that 
“[i]t is, of course, implicit in Goldblatt that a use restriction on real 
property may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the 
effectuation of a substantial public purpose,”66 when the Court 
identified Pennsylvania Coal as “the leading case for the proposition 
that a state statute that substantially furthers important public 
policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as 
to amount to a ‘taking,’”67 or, most problematically, when the 
majority concluded that “the restrictions imposed are substantially 
related to the promotion of the general welfare.”68 
Justice Brennan would live to regret these usages nine years later, 
when Justice Antonin Scalia, in his opinion for the majority in Nollan 
v. California Coastal Commission69 asserted, in opposition to Justice 
Brennan’s stinging dissent, that the Court’s “verbal formulations in 
the takings field have generally been quite different” from those used 
in due process and equal protection challenges.70  While Justice 
Brennan asserted that “[i]t is also by now commonplace that this 
Court’s review of the rationality of a State’s exercise of its police 
power demands only that the State ‘could rationally have decided’ 
that the measure adopted might achieve the State’s objective,”71 
Justice Scalia demurred, throwing in for good measure a quotation 
from his opponent: 
We have long recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a 
taking if it “substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests” and 
does not “den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land,” 
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 . . . (1980).  See also Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 . . . 
(1978) (“[A] use restriction may constitute a ‘taking’ if not 
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government 
purpose”).72 
 
 66. Id. at 127 (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 138 (emphasis added). 
 69. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 70. Id. at 834 n.3. 
 71. Id. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)). 
 72. Id. at 834. 
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Also unfortunate was the Penn Central majority’s treatment of 
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.73 (a facial challenge to 
zoning resolved on due process and equal protection grounds) as if it 
were a takings case,74 a practice that would be replicated time and 
again,75 including the majority opinion in Nollan.76  Moreover, the 
author would be remiss in failing to point out that regulatory takings 
scholarship appeared to have only a minimal impact on the Court’s 
ruling in Penn Central, the chief example being a curious reworking 
of a Michelman phrase (“distinct [later ‘reasonable’77] investment-
backed expectations”78)—without attribution.79 
In Penn Central, Justice Brennan, a longstanding hero to those on 
the ideological left, was not just humoring those colleagues who had a 
strong attachment to private property rights in order to garner their 
votes in favor of historic preservation.  As a member of the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey from 1952 until his elevation to the nation’s 
highest tribunal in 195680—an important geographical and temporal 
setting in the development of American zoning law—Justice Brennan 
participated in several influential zoning decisions.  In Katobimar 
Realty Co. v. Webster,81 for example, while the majority struck down 
 
 73. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 74. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 
(“Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining other land-use regulations . . . 
uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, 
can establish a ‘taking’ . . . .” (citing Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926))). 
 75. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal.0 v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust 
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1066 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). There are dozens of state and lower federal 
court opinions that repeat the error. See, e.g., Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 
F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 
381, 394 (1988); Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Bloomington, Ind. v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026, 
1030 (Ind. 1998). 
 76. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834–36. 
 77. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). 
 78. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127. 
 79. See Barton H. Thomson, Jr., The Allure of Consequential Fit, 51 ALA. L. 
REV. 1261 (2000).  Professor Thompson has noted, that “[t]he Supreme Court’s 
current preoccupation in the takings arena with ‘investment-backed expectations’ . . . 
actually stems from a misreading of Frank Michelman’s landmark 1967 article,” id. at 
1291, explaining that “Michelman coined the term to explain why the taking of a 
mere subset of property might require compensation, not as a general explanation for 
when a governmental regulation should be found to be a taking,” id. at 1291 n.160.   
 80. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/justices/ 
william_j_brennan_jr (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 81. 118 A.2d 824 (N.J. 1955). 
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a local government’s experiment with noncumulative zoning,82 Justice 
Brennan dissented, choosing in this instance to defer to the expertise 
of local officials: 
 New Jersey has witnessed a marked and salutary change in the 
judicial attitude toward municipal zoning over the past decade.  
Long overdue recognition of the legitimate aspirations of the 
community to further its proper social, economic and political 
progress, and of the propriety of requiring individual landowners to 
defer to the greater public good, have replaced the narrow concepts 
held by former courts.  Present-day decisions rightly give maximum 
play to the philosophy underlying our constitutional and statutory 
zoning provisions that localities may decide for themselves what 
zoning best serves and furthers the local public welfare, subject only 
to the rule of reason forbidding arbitrary and capricious action.83 
There was a limit to this deference, however, as illustrated by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in Reid Development Corp. 
v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township.84  In that decision, a unanimous 
court (including Justice Brennan) disapproved of the local 
government’s attempt to abuse its discretionary authority, concluding 
that “the extension of the [publicly owned] water facilities was 
plaintiff’s [Reid’s] right; and it was an abuse of discretion to use the 
grant as a means of coercing the landowner into acceptance of the 
minimum lot-size restriction upon his lands, however serviceable to 
the common good.”85 
That same tension between the judge’s obligation to defer to the 
other government branches when they operate in their areas of 
expertise and the judge’s obligation to protect individuals from abuse 
of state power is reflected in Justice Brennan’s Penn Central opinion, 
warts and all.  The predominant tone of the majority opinion was 
deferential, situating landmark designation with more familiar forms 
 
 82. See id. at 832 (“We are here concerned with the exclusion of a retail 
commercial use from a light industrial zone, in an area where such use is in keeping 
with the environment, if not indeed with the permissible light industrial uses.  This is 
not a question of ‘liberal’ zoning, but of zoning comporting with the constitutional 
rights of private property and the equal protection of the laws.”).  For a discussion on 
noncumulative zoning, see CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE 
PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A CASEBOOK 162–63 (2010); DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 5–43 (5th ed. 2003).  
 83. Katobimar, 118 A.2d at 832 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 84. 89 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1952). 
 85. Id. at 671. 
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of land use regulation such as zoning.86  Nevertheless, Justice 
Brennan’s serious invocation in Penn Central of the Holmesian 
notion that regulations can, under certain circumstances, result in 
unconstitutional takings would signal—as would others of his 
opinions that directly confronted local government overreaching and 
illegality87—that there were important libertarian values at stake in 
need of protection. 
Justice Brennan’s concerns about local governments riding 
roughshod over the rights of private property owners became crystal 
clear in his influential dissent in the 1981 decision, San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co.88  In his dissent, Justice Brennan took the time (and 
several pages) to weave a strong argument for the compensability of 
regulatory takings, noting that to the property owner an onerous 
regulation is the same as outright condemnation by eminent domain.89  
After the Court’s 2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,90 we 
refer to this as being “functionally equivalent.”91 
 
 86. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133 
(1978) (“[T]here is no basis whatsoever for a conclusion that courts will have any 
greater difficulty identifying arbitrary or discriminatory action in the context of 
landmark regulation than in the context of classic zoning or indeed in any other 
context.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43, 57 (1982) 
(answering “no” to the question of “whether a ‘home rule’ municipality, granted by 
the state constitution extensive powers of self-government in local and municipal 
matters, enjoys the ‘state action’ exemption from Sherman Act liability”); 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 523 (1981) (Brennan. J., 
concurring) (“San Diego’s billboard regulation bans all commercial and 
noncommercial billboard advertising with a few limited exceptions . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)); id. at 528 (“I would invalidate the San Diego ordinance.  The city has 
failed to provide adequate justification for its substantial restriction on protected 
activity.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (“Local governing 
bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 for monetary, 
declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be 
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or 
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 88. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
 89. Id. at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“From the property owner’s point of view, 
it may matter little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is 
restricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to 
deprive him of all beneficial use of it.”). 
 90. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 91. Id. at 539 (“Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be 
characterized as unified, these three inquiries . . . share a common touchstone.  Each 
aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic 
taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner 
from his domain.”). 
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Nor was Brennan the only hard-left justice to listen to the siren 
song of inverse condemnation and regulatory takings.92  One year 
after San Diego Gas, Baltimore’s civil rights icon, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall (who had joined Brennan’s dissent) authored the Court’s 
six-member majority opinion in another Big Apple special—Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.93  To Marshall and the five 
other justices forming the majority, this case was simple—in its long 
history, the Court had “invariably found” that “a permanent physical 
occupation of real property” was a taking.94  In this case, the physical 
invasion was effected by a cable television installation that eventually 
made the landlord’s building (and an adjoining structure) “cable-
ready.”  Marshall’s opinion, which seemed simply to build on a long 
line of precedents cited by Michelman and other takings 
commentators,95 planted three seeds that, in others’ hands, blossomed 
into takings trouble. 
First, the Loretto Court introduced the notion of a per se taking.96  
A decade later, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,97 Justice 
Antonin Scalia would follow Marshall’s lead by “recognizing” a 
second categorical taking (total deprivation of what some still call, 
based on a term used in the Penn Central oral argument,98 
 
 92. We should also remember that, on occasion, William O. Douglas included 
private property owners under the ample umbrella he constructed to protect 
individual liberties. See, e.g., Chongris v. Corrigan, 409 U.S. 919, 920 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is a nice question when police power comes to an end as 
a justification for public taking of private property.”); Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., Pa., 
369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962) (“Respondent in designing [the glide path for a runway] had to 
acquire some private property.  Our conclusion is that by constitutional standards it 
did not acquire enough.”); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (“If, by 
reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this 
land for any purpose, their loss would be complete.  It would be as complete as if the 
United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive 
possession of it.”(footnote omitted)). 
 93. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 94. Id. at 427. 
 95. See, e.g., id. at 427 n.5 (citing Michelman, Dunham, and other commentators). 
 96. See, e.g., id. at 435 n.12 (citation omitted) (“The dissent objects that the 
distinction between a permanent physical occupation and a temporary invasion will 
not always be clear.  This objection is overstated, and in any event is irrelevant to the 
critical point that a permanent physical occupation is unquestionably a taking.  In the 
antitrust area, similarly, this Court has not declined to apply a per se rule simply 
because a court must, at the boundary of the rule, apply the rule of reason and 
engage in a more complex balancing analysis.”).   
 97. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 98. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (“The 
city conceded at oral argument that if appellants can demonstrate at some point in 
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“economically viable” use).99  Second, Loretto opened the door for 
future challenges to a wide range of regulatory activity, such as (to 
cite two New York City examples) residential rent control100 and 
Single Room Occupancy (SRO) conversion restrictions101 that 
appeared to involve a government-compelled occupation by the 
public.  Third, by focusing on physical occupation (while ignoring the 
favorable economic impact of the challenged regulation), the Court 
made conceivable a new type of taking—exactions takings, such as in 
Nollan and Dolan v. City of Tigard.102  In those controversial 
decisions, landowners who were granted permission to enhance the 
value of their parcels—permission that could have easily and 
constitutionally been withheld—were able to prove that when the 
government practically “gave,” it illegally “took.”103 
 
the future that circumstances have so changed that the Terminal ceases to be 
‘economically viable,’ appellants may obtain relief.”). 
 99. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015–16 (“The second situation in which we have found 
categorical treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically 
beneficial or productive use of land.  As we have said on numerous occasions, the 
Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation ‘does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his 
land.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 
(1980))).  Unfortunately for advocates and judges seeking clarity in this muddled 
field, Justice Scalia did not settle on one usage to describe the extent of a per se 
deprivation, but instead varied his language: “all economically beneficial or 
productive use,” id. at 1015, “all economically beneficial use,” id. at 1027, 
“deprivation of all economically feasible use,” id. at 1016 n.7, “no productive or 
economically beneficial use,” id. at 1017, “economically idle,” id. at 1019, and 
“eliminate all economically valuable use,” id. at 1028. 
 100. See Harmon v. Markus, 412 Fed. App’x 420, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary 
order) (“Here, the Harmons argue principally that the [New York City Rent 
Stabilization Law] effects permanent physical occupation of their property on the 
ground that it affords their tenants ‘rights and protections having attributes of fee 
ownership.’” (quoting Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, Harmon v. Marcus, 412 
Fed. App’x 420 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1126-CV), 2011 WL 494370, at *13)). 
 101. See Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (N.Y. 1989) 
(“We conclude that Local Law No. 9 has effected a per se physical taking because it 
‘[interferes] so drastically’ with the SRO property owners’ fundamental rights to 
possess and to exclude.  The law requires nothing less of the owners than ‘to suffer 
the physical occupation of [their] [buildings] by third [parties].’” (quoting Nollan v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982))). 
 102. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 103. As the Court explained in its most recent regulatory takings decision, “In 
[Nollan and Dolan,] we held that a unit of government may not condition the 
approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s relinquishment of a portion of his 
property unless there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the 
government’s demand and the effects of the proposed land use.” Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013). 
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Justice Stevens, a jurist often identified with the ideological left like 
his colleagues Brennan and Marshall, stood firmly for private 
property rights protection as well, at least early in his tenure on the 
high court.  Justice Stevens began his takings “career” by joining 
fellow Republican-appointee William Rehnquist’s opinions in dissent 
in Penn Central and (a year later, in 1979) for the Court in Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States.104  Decades later in his long and distinguished 
membership on the Court, Stevens penned a devastating critique of 
property rights activism in 2002’s Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.105  Between these two 
bookends, the reader of Justice Stevens’s opinions can perceive this 
distinguished jurist’s frustration with some colleagues’ attempts to 
add muscle to Holmes’s skeletal “too far” formulation.  Indeed, 
Justice Stevens even penned the 1987 opinion that challenged 
Holmes’s concepts on the same turf—Pennsylvania coal mining.106 
This author’s personal favorite among the Stevens regulatory 
takings opus is his dissent in Nollan, featuring the following passage: 
 I write today to identify the severe tension between that dramatic 
development in the law and the view expressed by Justice Brennan’s 
dissent in this case that the public interest is served by encouraging 
state agencies to exercise considerable flexibility in responding to 
private desires for development in a way that threatens the 
preservation of public resources.  I like the hat that Justice Brennan 
has donned today better than the one he wore in San Diego, and I 
am persuaded that he has the better of the legal arguments here.  
Even if his position prevailed in this case, however, it would be of 
little solace to land-use planners who would still be left guessing 
about how the Court will react to the next case, and the one after 
that.  As this case demonstrates, the rule of liability created by the 
Court in First English is a shortsighted one.  Like Justice Brennan, I 
hope that “a broader vision ultimately prevails.”107 
As a former fellow traveler with the Court’s pro-takings wing, 
Justice Stevens could sympathize with Brennan’s dilemma.  It is 
unfortunate that, during the end of his last Term on the Court, Justice 
Stevens chose to recuse himself in Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,108 for we all 
 
 104. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
 105. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 106. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
 107. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 867 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 108. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
WOLF_CHRISTENSEN(DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:33 PM 
1852 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
would have benefited from his insights regarding the private property 
right movement’s latest Golem—judicial takings.109  That might have 
been some swan song! 
IV.  COURTS AND COMMENTARY: FORTY YEARS OF 
REGULATORY TAKINGS SCHOLARSHIP IN THE FORDHAM URBAN 
LAW JOURNAL 
Inspired by the Gotham takings twins—Penn Central and 
Loretto—the Supreme Court—especially the growing conservative 
bloc110—decided a growing number of regulatory takings challenges 
during the childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood of the 
Fordham Urban Law Journal.  While many of the cases have resulted 
in government victories,111 there have been some significant wins for 
private property rights advocates.112  Accompanying, prodding, and 
analyzing this growing body of law not only in the high court but in 
state and lower federal tribunals, has been a mushrooming library of 
legal scholarship.  The pages of this highly respected law journal over 
its forty-year run have featured an impressive array of regulatory 
takings pieces by professors, students, and others, as noted in Table 1. 
  
 
 109. See id. at 2602 (plurality opinion) (“If a legislature or a court declares that 
what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken 
that property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its 
value by regulation.”). 
 110. For a provocative survey of property rights cases in the high court that relies 
on Justice Harry Blackmun’s papers, see Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a 
Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights Movement Within the 
Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (2006). 
 111. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Connolly v. 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
 112. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012); 
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Babbitt v. Youpee, 
519 U.S. 234 (1997); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 483 U.S. 825 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Costal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
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TABLE 1 
 
REGULATORY TAKINGS SCHOLARSHIP IN THE 
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 
 
• Mary Spearing, Note, Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the 
Tax-Exempt Owner, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 123 (1974). 
• Richard Wolloch, Note, Penn Central v. City of New York: A 
Landmark Landmark Case, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 667 (1978). 
• Constance W. Cranch, Comment, The Regulation of Rental 
Apartment Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 534–39 (1980). 
• Samuel A. Turvey, Comment, Beyond the Taking Issue: Emerging 
Procedural Due Process Issues in Local Landmark Preservation 
Programs, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441 (1982). 
• John Martinez, Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine by Redefining 
Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157 (1988). 
• Ross B. Lipsker & Rebecca L. Heldt, Regulatory Taking: A 
Contract Approach, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195 (1988). 
• Judith A. Gilbert, Tenements and Takings: Tenement House 
Department of New York v. Moeschen as a Counterpoint to 
Lochner v. New York, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 437 (1991). 
• R.S. Radford, Book Review, Land Use Regulation and Legal 
Rhetoric; Broadening the Terms of the Debate, 21 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 413 (1994) (reviewing Dennis J. Coyle, Property Rights and the 
Constitution: Shaping Society Through Land Use Regulation 
(1993)). 
• William Michael Treanor, Takings Law and the Regulatory State: A 
Response to R.S. Radford, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 453 (1995). 
• Daniel William Russo, Note, Protecting Property Rights with Strict 
Scrutiny: An Argument for the “Specifically and Uniquely 
Attributable” Standard, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 575 (1998) 
• Robert W. DiUbaldo, Comment, A Second Take: Re-Examining 
Our Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence Post-Tahoe, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1949 (2003). 
• Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle: 
Kelo, Lingle, and Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613 (2007). 
• Laura J. Hatcher, The Odyssey of Palazzolo: Public Rights 
Litigation and Coastal Change, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (2009). 
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The course of takings scholarship, in the pages of this journal as 
elsewhere, was subject to unanticipated ebbs and flows, much like the 
law in the Supreme Court, as illustrated by the evolution of Justice 
Stevens’s takings jurisprudence.  Even before the Supreme Court’s 
reinvigoration of regulatory takings in Penn Central, student 
commentators Spearling and Wolloch addressed the ways in which 
historic preservation pitted private rights against the public good.113  
Interest in the constitutional implications of historic preservation 
remained keen even after the Court spoke, as illustrated by Turvey’s 
1982 exploration of potential procedural due process vulnerabilities.114  
Cranch’s exploration of the constitutionality of condominium 
conversion moratoria, a controversial local government program in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, included analysis of the regulatory takings 
issues.115 
After an eight-year hiatus, during which the Supreme Court (in 
cases such as San Diego Gas) failed to directly confront the question 
of whether property owners affected by regulatory takings (like those 
whose properties are taken by the affirmative exercise of eminent 
domain itself) are entitled to just compensation in the form of 
monetary relief, the justices presented three important substantive 
decisions in 1987: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,116 First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,117 
and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis.118  These three 
decisions, the first two victories for the private property rights 
movement, provided ample fodder for academic debates over the 
nature, extent, and implications of regulatory takings.  During the 
following year, the pages of the Fordham Urban Law Journal 
featured a fascinating pair of articles: Martinez’s “first step toward 
reconstruction of existing takings doctrine along functional lines,”119 
 
 113. Mary Spearing, Note, Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the Tax-
Exempt Owner, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 123 (1974); Richard Wolloch, Note, Penn 
Central v. City of New York: A Landmark Landmark Case, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
667 (1978). 
 114. Samuel A. Turvey, Comment, Beyond the Taking Issue: Emerging Procedural 
Due Process Issues in Local Landmark Preservation Programs, 10 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 441 (1982). 
 115. Constance W. Cranch, Comment, The Regulation of Rental Apartment 
Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 534–39 (1980). 
 116. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 117. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
 118. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
 119. John Martinez, Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property 
and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 194 (1988). 
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and Lipsker and Heldt’s proposed contract strategy as “a more clearly 
defined and more easily applied approach to the regulatory takings 
problem.”120  Unfortunately, and despite the best efforts of these 
creative commentators, the confusion among, and engendered by, the 
justices continues to this day. 
In the 1990s, journal contributors and their readers shifted the 
focus to the history and ideology informing the Takings Clause and 
the police power.  Gilbert wonderfully explored the litigation 
establishing the constitutionality of the New York Tenement House 
Act of 1901, despite the onerous financial burden the law allegedly 
placed on landlords.121  The profound ideological gap between 
regulatory takings advocates and skeptics was dramatically illustrated 
by Radford’s generally favorable review of an attempt to address “the 
existing pro-regulatory bias in the [private property rights] 
literature.”122  This review prompted Fordham law professor (and 
future dean) William Michael Treanor to respond by pointing out 
that “[t]here is a critical threshold problem with using this text [the 
Takings Clause] to require compensation for regulations: the 
language of the Clause doesn’t apply to regulations at all.”123  Russo’s 
Note proposed a more demanding standard for exactions cases like 
Nollan and Dolan, arguing that increasing the protections for 
property owners would be consistent with the framers’ intent and 
with the political realities of local government regulation.124 
The new century brought no clarity to the takings issue, only new 
wrinkles and complications.  The most recent regulatory takings 
contributions to this journal were all bold attempts to make sense, 
and address the wider implications, of the Court’s decisions in 
 
 120. Ross B. Lipsker & Rebecca L. Heldt, Regulatory Taking: A Contract 
Approach, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195, 260 (1988). 
 121. See Judith A. Gilbert, Tenements and Takings: Tenement House Department 
of New York v. Moeschen as a Counterpoint to Lochner v. New York, 18 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 437 (1990); see also Tenement House Dep’t v. Moeschen, 72 N.E. 231 (N.Y. 
1904), aff’d, 203 U.S. 583 (1906) (per curiam). 
 122. R.S. Radford, Land Use Regulation and Legal Rhetoric: Broadening the 
Terms of the Debate, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 415 (1994) (reviewing DENNIS 
COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH 
LAND USE REGULATION (1993)). 
 123. William Michael Treanor, Takings Law and the Regulatory State: A 
Response to R.S. Radford, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 453, 457 (1995). 
 124. See Daniel William Russo, Note, Protecting Property Rights with Strict 
Scrutiny: An Argument for the “Specifically and Uniquely Attributable” Standard, 
25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 575, 599 (1998) (“By requiring that land use exactions be 
specifically and uniquely attributable to the projected impact of the new 
development, individual private property rights will be restored.”). 
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Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,125 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,126 and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc.127  Frustrated by the Court’s insistence on distinguishing partial 
(Penn Central) from total (Lucas) takings, DiUbaldo would shift the 
focus to the loss experienced by the property owner.128  Baron argued 
convincingly “that the Court was far more effective in Lingle than it 
was in Kelo [v. City of New London]129 in engaging directly with 
public unease about the relationship between government and private 
property,”130 and contemplated the possible impact these 2005 
decisions would have on redevelopment projects.131  Hatcher’s timely 
article illustrated how the Palazollo story “suggests that the ethics of 
litigating coastal takings cases may be complicated by the possibilities 
of natural disasters and sea level change.”132  In the wake of the 
Court’s conflicting set of opinions in Stop the Beach Renourishment 
regarding the legitimacy of the notion of judicial takings, we can 
anticipate that in the courts and in the pages of this journal, sea-level 
change and climate change accommodation strategies will be the new 
regulatory takings battleground.133 
V.  URBAN REGULATORY TAKINGS: A GROWTH INDUSTRY FOR 
COURTS AND COMMENTATORS 
What effects has this city-inspired body of law had on the field of 
urban law, and what can we expect in the future?  To date, regulatory 
takings law has been used to challenge urban elements such as, but by 
 
 125. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 126. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 127. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 128. Robert W. DiUbaldo, Comment, A Second Take: Re-Examining Our 
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence Post-Tahoe, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1949 (2003). 
 129. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  The implications of the hyper-controversial Kelo 
decision were the subject of an informative set of articles in issue four of volume 
thirty-eight of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. See Symposium, Taking New York: 
Opportunities, Challenges & Dangers Posed by the Use of Eminent Domain in New 
York, 38 Fordham Urb. L.J. 963 (2011). 
 130. Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle: Kelo, 
Lingle, and Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 
616 (2007). 
 131. Id. at 652–55. 
 132. Laura J. Hatcher, The Odyssey of Palazzolo: Public Rights Litigation and 
Coastal Change, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 850 (2009). 
 133. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Strategies for Making Sea-Level Rise 
Adaptation Tools “Takings-Proof,” 28 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2013). 
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no means limited to, historic preservation,134 rent control,135 
condominium and co-op conversion,136 rezoning,137 airspace 
restrictions,138 redevelopment,139 amortization of nonconforming 
uses,140 exactions,141 and inclusionary zoning.142 
In the future—a future that, thanks to a sharply divided Supreme 
Court’s property-rights friendly decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Management District,143 will most likely feature dramatically 
expanded application of Nollan/Dolan—we can anticipate regulatory, 
and perhaps even judicial, takings challenges to monetary exactions,144 
urban environmental controls such as green building requirements,145 
 
 134. See, e.g., United Artists’ Theater Circuit v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612 
(Pa. 1993) (addressing the constitutionality of requiring theater owners to preserve 
the historic character of the theater’s interior and exterior under threat of criminal 
punishment).   
 135. See, e.g., Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & 
Cmty. Renewal, 83 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting a takings-based challenge to rent 
control laws in New York City). 
 136. See, e.g., Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 1991) (addressing 
regulation of condominium and co-op conversion in response to a takings argument 
by plaintiffs). 
 137. See, e.g., William C. Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (upholding rezoning ordinances and other land use ordinances imposed by 
city). 
 138. See, e.g., McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110 (Nev. 2006) 
(holding that a height ordinance constituted a regulatory taking of the aerospace 
above plaintiff’s property and required compensation).   
 139. See, e.g., Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998) (addressing 
challenge to municipal relocation assistance ordinance). 
 140. See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. 1998) 
(holding that a forfeiture of a nonconforming use of a rental property, based on the 
failure of a landlord’s predecessor to register the nonconforming use with the city, 
did not constitute a compensable taking). 
 141. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (analyzing 
the use of impact fees to regulate developments and encourage certain types of land 
use under the concept of takings jurisprudence). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Egg Harbor Assocs. (Bayshore Centre), 464 A.2d 1115 (N.J. 
1983) (holding that inclusionary zoning policies requiring a fixed percentage of 
affordable housing did not constitute a compensable taking).   
 143. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013) (“We hold that the government’s demand for 
property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan 
and Dolan even when the government denies the permit and even when its demand is 
for money.”). 
 144. See id. at 2599 (“[W]e reject respondent’s argument and hold that so-called 
‘monetary exactions’ must satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality requirements 
of Nollan and Dolan.”);  see also Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623 
(2012). 
 145. See, e.g., Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED: Municipal 
Adoption of Private Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285 (2010); Michael 
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and, in this increasingly ideologically supercharged legal atmosphere, 
government bailouts (such as Hank Greenberg’s class action suit 
against the United States government146).  In other words, there will 
likely be ample material for at least four more decades in the life of 
this important, influential journal. 
 
Allan Wolf, A Yellow Light for “Green Zoning”: Some Words of Caution About 
Incorporating Green Building Standards into Local Land Use Law, 43 URB. LAW. 
949 (2011). 
 146. See Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, in which the United States Court of 
Federal Claims held:  
In its initial and amended complaints, Starr alleged that through the actions 
of (1) the imposition of the Credit Agreement on September 22, 2008 by 
which the Government obtained a 79.9% equity interest in American 
International Group, Inc. (“AIG”), and (2) the reverse stock split on June 
30, 2009 by which shareholders were denied a separate vote, the 
Government effected a taking or illegal exaction of the property of 
shareholders in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  
In a prior opinion and order on the Government’s motion to dismiss, the 
Court determined that Starr had sufficiently pled these two events as 
government actions allegedly requiring just compensation, although the 
Court made no determination as to the merits of such claims. 
  On December 3, 2012, Starr filed a motion for class certification and 
appointment of class counsel, with an accompanying memorandum. In its 
motion and memorandum, Starr proposed two classes, one for each of these 
government actions, that consist of the named plaintiff and other similarly 
situated individuals or entities whose property was allegedly 
expropriated . . . .  After careful review, and for the reasons set forth below, 
plaintiff’s motion to certify the classes and appoint class counsel is granted. 
109 Fed .Cl. 628, 631–32 (2013) (citation omitted); see also Andrew Sajac, AIG Seeks 
to Dismiss Greenberg’s Challenge to U.S. Bailout, WASH. POST., Apr. 9, 2013, at A10 
(“AIG ‘would face incalculable harm’ to its brand, image and relationships with 
shareholders, customers, regulators and elected officials if the company joined a suit 
against the government brought by Greenberg’s Starr International Co. Inc., AIG 
said in asking the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in Washington to uphold its decision 
not to join the litigation.”). 
